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Resource Use Decisions: A Framework for Studying 
Religion and Sustainable Environments
Analyses of everyday religion and sustainable 
environments in the Himalaya are not helped 
much by the blunt instruments of ‘world 
religions’ approaches to religion and ecology. 
This article suggests that a better grounded 
understanding, especially helpful for policy 
makers integrating case studies from widely 
varying regions, might be gained by bypassing 
debates about the nature of ‘religion’ entirely. 
Inspired by discussions in the Everyday Religion 
and Sustainable Environments in the Himalaya 
(ERSEH) project, this article proposes a 
research framework with the deliberately 
mundane name resource use decisions. 
Attending to the reasons given, in various 
settings and to various stakeholders, for 
decisions regarding the cultivation and use of 
resources will take us beyond unreflectively 
secular understandings of these terms, as 
well as beyond reified understandings of             
‘other-worldly’ religion which exist more in the 
texts of scholars than in the everyday worlds 
where religion lives. Consonant with the recent 
turn to ‘lived religion,’ resource use decisions 
draws attention to the religious creativity of 
agents at every level, lay, specialist and even 
other-than-human, and to the categories 
they employ in navigating and sustaining 
religious worlds. This approach better suits the 
ecologically, culturally and politically varied and 
changing Himalayan region, but also suggests 
ways in which Himalayan studies can contribute 
to broader reflection on the nature of religious 
practices and traditions in a pluralizing, 
globalizing and environmentally changing 
world.
Keywords: religion, environment, lived religion, resources, 
Himalaya.
Mark Larrimore
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Most disturbing was the apparent deflection 
of my questions about religion with responses 
that concerned the welfare and integrity of the 
community. (Ramble 2008: 13)
Introduction
The image of the Himalaya as all soaring peaks, with scant 
attention to what happens in the valleys and hillsides be-
tween and below, is not unlike a common way of thinking 
about world religions. Indeed, the two caricatures unite 
in the cliché of the holy man perched on a mountaintop 
dispensing wisdom to questioners who have left the flat 
world but are doomed to return to it. The truths of reli-
gion, pellucid in the pure air of sacred climes, are obscured 
in the valleys below—which is what drove the sage to the 
peaks in the first place. More grounded studies of Hima-
layan experience, struggling against such understandings, 
have long called for “retheorizing religion” for this region 
(Grieve 2006).
The case studies included in this special section of 
HIMALAYA offer a kindred challenge to dominant 
conceptions of religion. In the broader set of conversations 
bridging academic, policy, and activist communities 
and concerns from which they emerged, Everyday 
Religion and Sustainable Environments in the Himalaya, 
the focus on ‘everyday religion’ proved liberating. The 
modifier ‘everyday’ overcame misgivings many had 
about approaching ‘religion’ as an object of research and 
reflection. Questions about what could count as ‘religion’ 
and how to engage with it, carefully avoided at the level 
of theory, proved accessible and fruitful when linked to 
questions of practice and everyday life, leading finally 
to supple analyses of the interpenetration of values and 
practices theoretical views of religion render opaque if not 
unintelligible. 
The current essay articulates a way of approaching reli-
gion and ecology questions inspired by these discussions. 
Neither embracing nor ignoring the problematic category 
of religion, it instead works (a little polemically) with the 
prosaic-seeming categories ‘resource,’ ‘use’ and ‘decision.’ 
It seeks to surface patterns of practice invisible to naively 
religious and secular accounts of environmental issues 
alike. After laying out the model, I relate it to the turn to 
‘lived religion’ in the contemporary academic study of 
religion, making explicit ways it might help us get beyond 
the distortions generated by modern western categories 
of religion in general, and ‘world religions’ in particular. 
Familiarity with these debates isn’t necessary for use of 
this model, and some of the insights it offers will be old 
hat to professional Himalayanists. The affinities are worth 
spelling out, however. These case studies can not only be 
brought into conversation by the model, but might also 
help broader discussions of ‘religion and the environment,’ 
‘religion and ecology’ and ‘religion and nature’ outflank as-
sumptions rooted in dominant views of ‘religion,’ arguably 
“the most ideological of western creations” (Dubuisson 
2003: 147).
Resource Use Decisions 
Participants in Everyday Religion and Sustainable Environ-
ments in the Himalaya (ERSEH) initially shied away from 
discussion of religion because most theories of religion, 
academic and popular, start with the affirmation or re-
jection of a supernatural, transcendent or cosmic context 
for human existence. The resource use decisions model 
(hereafter RUD) starts closer to the ground, calculatedly 
appearing banal: the everyday lives of ordinary people. Its 
starting assumption is that human projects of every kind 
require resources. Whatever may be claimed for other pow-
ers and entities, human beings cannot make something out 
of nothing. Resources are generally limited, often shared 
and usually require care. Decisions have to be made about 
their cultivation, employment and distribution within (and 
beyond) human communities. “Religion-like” practices 
(Taves 2012), however conceived by those who engage in 
and support them, are braided with other practices, shar-
ing resources like time and space, labor and wealth.1 
At its most basic, a resource is a thing you can do other 
things with. Not much can be done without resources, in-
cluding the religion-like. But it isn’t just that religion uses 
secular resources. Human projects of all kinds use religious 
resources. Waters, including variously pure or purified wa-
ters, are resources. So are the energies of mountains, the 
goodwill of ghosts and gods, the powers of special objects 
and of those specialists born with or trained in particular 
abilities. Ecology frameworks can facilitate the modeling 
of connections between components of local systems and 
can help clarify what is known and not known. A broad 
understanding of resources makes clear the extent to 
which resource uses are mutual and relational. The idea of 
resources stockpiled independently of projects, and indeed 
constituted as resources by this stockpiling (what Heide-
gger 1982: 17 called “standing reserve”) obscures these 
synergies and dependencies and the broader communities 
of human and other-than-human persons (Harvey 2005) 
cultivating them.
Use refers to the engagement of resources in human 
practices and projects. This is again a deliberately broad 
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definition. It is designed to draw attention to the variety 
of ends of human activity, a variety far exceeding the 
emaciated ideal of the utility-maximizing homo economicus 
(Foley 2006). People don’t just act in less than economically 
‘rational’ ways in using the resources at their disposal; sig-
nificant parts of culture involve sacrifice and squander of 
surplus. (Georges Bataille [1992] suggests this is the heart 
of religion.) Employed unreflectively, the term ‘use’ could 
be a limiting term, privileging consumption over creation, 
cultivation and relationship, but it has the advantage of 
reminding us that resources can get used up, that human 
activities—including ‘religious’ ones—cost something. In 
practice the distinction between resources and uses is 
not easy to draw. One of the main uses is the production 
or reproduction of resources, and one main category of 
resources is human time, effort and skill in use. In tandem 
with thinking of resources in broad, mutual and relational 
ways which include the ‘religious,’ it may be best to think 
of resource uses in terms of relationships of care and reci-
procity across human and other-than-human populations.
Decisions, finally, draws attention to the determinations 
people make—individually and as members of collectivi-
ties—about resource use in ever changing social, econom-
ic and cultural landscapes. The need for decision is not 
restricted to times of change, although these are the times 
when decisions are most self-conscious. Our attention 
should be directed not only to what is decided but to how 
decisions are come to, as people seek advice and prece-
dents; cite, balance or contest authorities; seek validation 
from various sources; and give reasons of various kinds to 
various stakeholders (Schielke and Debevek 2012: 2). Re-
source uses affect others, so decisions about resource uses 
will inevitably be made in the context of relationships—not 
all of them, of course, harmonious. These relationships 
should not be understood as restricted only to living hu-
man beings. Relationships with spirits and forests can be 
just as messy as interpersonal human relationships and are 
in many ways entwined with them (Orsi 2005; Jain 2011). 
The language of decision, too, must be handled with some 
care. Often what strikes observers as a decision is not expe-
rienced as such by those making it. There are many situa-
tions in which initiative is disowned or at least disavowed. 
Decisions taken by past generations congeal as custom and 
tradition, which may seem to have an almost superhu-
man authority (Bourdieu 1992); societies seem capable of 
“provisionally forgetting” their role in some of their own 
decisions (Ramble 2008: 356). Human beings also aren’t the 
only deciders, as dreams and rituals of divination and au-
gury make clear. Many people are excluded from decisions. 
And yet resources are allocated or reallocated for old and 
new uses, and these changed or unchanged circumstances 
sometimes need to be explained to the people affected—
even if it is to assert why they cannot be questioned. And 
of course decisions can be contested, too. Observing when 
and how habitual decision-making practices are upset and 
recalibrated can reveal how structures of authority such as 
expertise are recognized, challenged and reconfigured.
The RUD model is not exhaustive but it offers a promising 
template for facilitating the analysis and integration of 
case studies in policy contexts. The categories of resource, 
use, and decision are intended to focus attention on ele-
ments of social, ecological and symbolic systems over-
shadowed by bulky definitions of sacred or secular. They 
show that elements too often quarantined as ‘religious’ are 
engaged and active throughout these practices. Distinc-
tions made on the ground complicate the categories com-
monly employed in policy discussions, showing these to be 
incomplete, distortive of indigenous understandings and 
experiences of relation and agency. By holding theories of 
religion at bay as it assembles fuller and more site-specific 
repertoires of resources, uses and decisions, the model 
has the potential to free policy analysis from invidious 
religious, as well as secular, assumptions.
Lived Religion Approaches
While inspired by the discussions around Everyday Reli-
gion and Sustainable Environments in the Himalaya, the 
RUD framework has affinities with the recent turn among 
religious studies scholars in the United States to what 
is known as ‘lived religion.’2 This concept is a relatively 
recent arrival on the academic scene, without an ortho-
doxy or even a dedicated journal. In part this is because 
it comes at the confluence of several academic disci-
plines. One could say that focus on ‘lived religion’ arose 
in tandem with the turn to the social in history, the turn 
to the cultural in sociology, and every discipline’s turn to 
the ethnographic. It has been shaped by the discoveries 
and re-descriptions of women’s history and ‘history from 
below,’ leavened by questions about the nature and future 
of religion in modern and putatively secularizing western 
societies, and is in turn reshaping the field of religious 
studies (see Orsi 2012b; Roberts 2013; Lewis 2015). 
The term ‘lived religion’ suggests differences between 
religion as preached and as practiced.3 It also emphasizes 
that, contrary to the grim or gleeful predictions of a centu-
ry’s worth of secularization theorists, reports of religion’s 
demise have been greatly exaggerated. It’s alive!—but it 
lives in ways we are only belatedly coming to understand. 
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Indeed, the lived religion approach finds signs of vitality in 
the very practices and traditions which advocates as well 
as critics of ‘religion’ have tended to read as signs of decay. 
Let me focus on three important commitments of this ap-
proach: the interdependence of everyday and elite people 
and practices, the prominence of this-worldly concerns, 
and the syncretic bricolage of traditions. 
First, the lived religion approach foregrounds the everyday 
lives of ordinary (lay) people, but is not interested exclu-
sively in them. Unlike many studies devoted to ‘popular’ or 
‘everyday’ religion, it does not imagine these to be effec-
tively independent of the ‘bigger’ traditions studied by 
scholars of texts and institutions. Everyday practices are 
informed by and articulated in tension with larger institu-
tions, discourses and power structures. The process is not 
necessarily adversarial. Distinctions like those between 
official and everyday religion are not so much false as lo-
cally constructed and contested. Where western-modeled 
theological or cosmic histories tell of religious traditions 
and institutions created from outside the human world, 
and certainly from outside the world of everyday life, 
lived religion insists on human participation: “there is ... 
no religion that people have not taken up in their hands” 
(Orsi 2003: 172). Theories positing a fundamental conflict 
between sacred and profane (Durkheim 1995; Eliade 1987) 
are abstractions of the scholar’s study. The lived religion 
orientation finds instead that “hybridity, pastiche and 
‘making do’ are the constitutive aspects of religion”—even 
in the lives of elites and specialists—and as such are “ap-
propriate places to begin discussions of ethics and norms 
(Bender 2012: 274).
Second, the student of lived religion is not surprised when 
people engage in religion-like practices for ‘this-worldly’ 
benefit. The study of lived religion takes for granted that 
religious practices emerge and are maintained or modified 
because they answer needs—including worldly human 
ones. (I use terms like ‘worldly,’ ‘this-worldly’ and ‘mun-
dane’ polemically.) Attentive as much to the daily work of 
maintaining life and relationships as to the ways religious 
practices are modified in response to changing circum-
stances, it doesn’t wonder at the this-worldly aims of reli-
gious practices seeking fertility, long life and even success 
in business and education, rather insisting that we learn to 
see how these might be religion-like concerns too. 
Third, the study of lived religion sees bricolage as normal 
and healthy.4 The mixing and mingling of resources, uses 
and decisions from many sources is not condemned as 
fundamentally irreverent but accepted as part of practices 
of creative problem-solving. Bricolage should be distin-
guished from the “lazy sobriquet of syncretism” (Ramble 
2008: 215), a term implying a wide-ranging and unmotivat-
ed mashing and mangling of traditions. Bricoleurs navigate 
within and across traditions; they don’t seek to unify let 
alone homogenize them. Their concern is not systematic 
(they generally have neither the need nor the power to 
construct ‘a religion’); their practice in its way depends 
on a loose plurality of resources. The game-changer might 
be the move from assuming that syncretism is the devi-
ant exception, in need of explanation and mitigation, to 
seeing works of what’s been called “anti-syncretism”—
setting-apart, purification, systematization—as the ones 
requiring explanation (Shaw and Stewart 1994). This 
change of stance will not just open non-pathologizing 
perspectives on the messy virtuosity of practice; it gener-
ates non-pathologizing perspectives on purity concerns, 
too. From a lived religion perspective we could see the 
setting apart of elite practices and institutions as a form of 
resource cultivation. 
One could summarize the upshot of the lived religion 
orientation as seeing all people as engaged in making and 
remaking worlds (Orsi 2003, 2005). The worlds of religious 
people are not necessarily built in compensation, correc-
tion or refutation of the unsatisfactory world of every-
day life. It is better not to assume that everyday life and 
religion are opposed at all. The places and people set apart 
in explicitly religious settings may best be understood in 
terms of just these ways of and reasons for setting apart, 
rather than supposing them effectively or ideally auton-
omous realms competing for souls with a fallen samsaric 
world. The set apart is still, of course, accessible. 
‘World’ is a wily word worth claiming. It can lead to 
understandings of fragile ‘worldviews’ as well as to the 
expectation, disappointed more often than fulfilled, that 
people should have worked out a rationally “meaningful 
cosmos” (Weber 1978: 451; Berger 1990). The lived religion 
theorist’s understanding is less intellectualistic, concerned 
more to assert that people of all kinds need and maintain 
a coherent field for their projects, an environment of 
interlocutors and a horizon for individual and collective 
striving. A world here is not an articulated awareness of 
the limits, conditions, origins and ends of things but some-
thing more like the opposite: a livable world is one we can, 
to a significant extent, take for granted as a background 
for endeavor or reflection. It doesn’t require blind accep-
tance or vigilant defense against chaos, but lives in use. It 
might be helpful to reconceptualize the ‘worlds’ of ‘world 
religions’ in a similar way.
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Getting Past ‘Religion’ 
All of this may seem obvious in a Himalayanist context 
where Hindu polytropy (Gellner 2005) and Mahayana 
understandings of conventional reality layer with older 
traditions in conspicuously pluralistic geological and eco-
logical territory. However, it departs decisively from the 
assumptions of what is still the dominant view of religion 
in much of contemporary academia and beyond, a view 
deeply enmeshed in all the categories and structures of the 
modern world system, and one likely to shape non-spe-
cialists’ expectations of Himalayan realities. In recent 
years the critique of the category of religion has virtually 
become a field of its own (Asad 1993, 2003; Dubuisson 2003; 
Fitzgerald 2005; Masuzawa 2005; McCutcheon 1997). These 
criticisms reveal ‘religion’ to reify and universalize con-
tingent features of modern western colonial experience, 
but their arguments are little known beyond the academy. 
Lived religion-like approaches may be more effective.
The dominant view is shared by friends and foes of religion 
alike. It sees religion as by definition out-of-the-ordinary 
if not indeed concerned with renouncing or transcend-
ing the everyday world. It thinks of religion as a separate 
realm of human concern, relating generally to a separate 
world or plane of existence, and served by institutions 
which stand at best in a productive tension with the 
everyday world and its practices. It thinks of religion as 
struggling to make access to this separate world or level 
of experience available through practices of setting apart, 
ascesis, purification and sanctification. The struggle is not 
only with other kinds of institutions, but with the fickle-
ness of ordinary human nature, and with the other (false, 
inferior, superstitious, syncretistic) systems it prefers.
This conception of religion emerged in modern times in 
the west but many religious studies scholars see it more 
specifically as ‘Protestant.’ It was indeed christened by 
the German Romantic theologian and future father of 
liberal Protestantism Friedrich Schleiermacher in 1799. 
Working on analogy with the new science of chemistry, 
Schleiermacher claimed to have found that religion has 
an ‘essence’ distinct from ethics and science, norms and 
explanations. Religion’s “essence is neither thinking nor 
acting, but intuition and feeling” (Schleiermacher 1988: 
103). Metaphysics, morality and religion have too often 
been conflated and confused, generating entirely warrant-
ed Enlightenment critiques: religion makes bad science, 
and impure morality. Yet the Enlighteners went too far in 
thinking religion itself thereby refuted. Once understood 
in its true nature religion is seen alone to give depth and 
indeed humanity to the abstract and impersonal ways of 
thinking and acting of metaphysics and morals. Religion 
should be a “holy music” accompanying the activities of 
life (Schleiermacher 1988: 110), and when it strays into 
other areas, as it inevitably will, should be called back to 
itself. Schleiermacher thinks Christianity, especially in its 
Protestant form, unique in history in fully understanding 
religion’s elusive nature.
Schleiermacher claimed to have ‘rediscovered’ the es-
sence of religion. Scholars today are more apt to call him 
the ‘inventor’ of religion. The turn from Enlightenment 
to Romanticism and Empire saw the ‘invention’; of many 
categories of which it is helpful to see religion as just one: 
race, complementary gender, nation and, Michel Foucault 
suggested, the human itself. These inventions did not come 
from thin air, of course. They seemed to their inventors to 
be discoveries because they arose from post-Reformation 
practices and structures already so entrenched as to seem 
natural. Schleiermacher’s understanding of religion as a 
realm apart speaks to and from the world opened up by 
the 17th century treaties of Westphalia—separating church 
and state while also setting them up as parallel (Beyer 
2011a, 2011b). “Methodological nationalism” (Wimmer and 
Schiller 2003) and what Sondra Hausner and David Gellner 
(2012) in response call “methodological religionism” are 
entwined problems.
Born of a “historical situation of religious pluralism and 
rivalry” (Smith 1990: 24-25), the dominant view of religion 
is the product of broader social, political and economic 
forces of which Protestantism is only one expression. It 
has been shared by theorists and critics of religion who are 
skeptics and atheists as well as by thinkers drawing from 
traditions in Catholic, Jewish and even Orthodox thought. 
Thinkers like Ludwig Feuerbach, Edward Burnett Tylor and 
Emile Durkheim shared with Protestantism, or perhaps 
with Empire, the sense that religion was a process of tran-
scending the local, the ritual, the material—and thought it 
might eventually transcend itself. Much in social science 
theory and research on religious topics traces to categories 
and methods emerging from these debates. The mod-
ern view of religion—focused on individual experiences 
of transcendence, etc.—persists in dogmatic form even 
among the ‘new atheists.’
The influence of the dominant view has been strong in 
the popular and academic study of religion, notably in the 
category of the ‘world religions.’ Tomoko Masuzawa (2005) 
has shown how certain religions were deemed worthy of 
that designation in late 19th century western scholarship 
because of their apparent transcendence of merely 
‘national,’ this-worldly and ritual concerns. The truest 
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and most transcendent religion was thought to reside in a 
world of radical otherness, whether in a moment of pure 
disembodied consciousness or an inaccessible mountain 
fastness. This view underlay scholars’ antipathy for most 
forms of western religion, including Roman Catholicism, 
and their fascination with Indian and Buddhist traditions 
figured as world-rejecting or world–transcending. The 
apparently pluralistic ‘world religions’ paradigm posits 
and celebrates analogs to western universalism as the true 
heart of religion (Masuzawa 2005). 
The world religions paradigm excludes much more than 
it includes. It does not only privilege a small number of 
‘great’ traditions but favors only certain strands within 
them. It encourages us to suppose there is such a thing as 
an essential Buddhism or Hinduism or Islam, and to expect 
to find it embattled by worldly and ritualizing mediocri-
ties, as well as restive, lazy and indiscriminate masses. In 
so doing this paradigm strengthens those within these 
traditions who try (often anachronistically) to articulate 
and enforce uniformity, hierarchical authority and the 
strongest claims for radical discontinuity with other social 
and cultural formations. Concerns for doctrinal purity are 
not new or Western, of course, but the centralizing imper-
atives of ‘fundamentalisms’ seeking an unvarying purity 
immune to the passage of time arguably are. 
Lived religion approaches, by contrast, have no invest-
ment in the answers to questions like ‘Is X Buddhist?’ or 
‘Is Y Hindu?’ if these are not questions being asked by 
someone on the ground. In such cases more specific and 
concrete things will always be at stake, and we will want 
to know what they are. Lived religion, and people making 
resource use decisions, don’t spend time on the question ‘Is 
X religious?’ either—though its interest is piqued every 
time someone else asks it. In particular contexts it may 
be a very important question—likely triggered by legal 
concerns. If a context leads someone to ask one of these 
questions, there’s a good chance more than one under-
standing of ‘Buddhist’ or ‘religious’ is involved, none really 
corresponding in general or in particular to the template 
of the world religions.
One can summarize the case against the dominant view by 
saying that ‘religion,’ claiming to be a descriptive category, 
is really a normative one (McGuire 2008). Whether used by 
those who want to protect ‘religion’ or destroy it, this view 
sees religion in its truest form as other-worldly, striving to 
represent in consistency and purity an alternative to the 
mundane passions and muddled compromises of human 
life. While apparently charmed by naïve practice, this ap-
proach systematically defers to the views of religious elites 
and authorities, sharing their contempt for this-worldly 
concerns and their horror at perceived syncretism. It sees 
ordinary folks as dupes, cynics or manipulators (Latour 
2010). It doesn’t deny that ordinary people can integrate 
religion into their lives, indeed reorganize their lives in 
rough accordance with it, but it thinks only the initiated, 
those whose lives are set apart from the everyday, really 
understand what’s at stake. 
The study of lived religion is a tonic to those who wish to 
move beyond the dominant view. Lived religion approach-
es assert the humanity and creativity of all traditions and 
people within them. While not assuming that religion is 
always (or ever) a good thing, it takes seriously people’s 
decisions about practices and the devotion of resources to 
them, and attends to the categories and distinctions they 
use in bringing together and setting apart the elements 
of their worlds. The dominant view trades in politically 
loaded abstractions. Lived religion approaches like resource 
use decisions direct our attention to where and how reli-
gion lives, and to how the worlds shared by human and          
other-than-human are sustained in practice and in time.
Conclusion
I hope I’ve suggested why debates in academic religious 
studies both matter and shouldn’t detain us too long. It is 
not important to the project of grasping everyday reli-
gion’s role in Himalayan ecologies to be able to name the 
traditions we are seeing, though it may matter very much 
how they are experienced and named by the people we 
are concerned with. It is also not important to be able to 
distinguish ‘religious’ from, say, ‘traditional,’ ‘social’ or 
‘common sense’ practices, except in the surprisingly varied 
contexts in which these categories are being employed 
to explain or interrogate resource use decisions. It is not 
important to distinguish ‘syncretism’ from whatever it is 
contrasted with, nor to isolate practices or beliefs in-
volving other, purer worlds than this one. Engaging the 
religion-like in the work, relationships and decisions of 
the everyday, whether of ordinary people or of religious 
specialists, we get a better sense of what’s going on, and in 
terms more directly useful for policy analysis and engage-
ment. 
At the various scales where religion lives, Himalayan 
religious worlds prove as varied and interconnected as 
their natural and cultural environments. New challenges 
to these worlds, ecological and demographic as well 
as political, provide concentrated versions of issues 
confronting communities around the world. Resource 
landscapes of all kinds—natural, human and other-than-
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human—are changing dramatically. Exclusivist and 
newly globalized versions of older religious traditions 
from Hinduism and Christianity to Tibetan traditions are 
upsetting pluralist social ecologies even as Lepcha and Bön 
experience a need to demand recognition as ‘religions’ 
after all. Widely different political systems classify, 
support and limit ‘religious’ practices and institutions in 
dramatically different ways. 
Dominant views of religion, of world religions, and of the 
world-renouncing religions which supposedly rise above 
Himalayan societies illuminate little of how religion is 
lived or environments sustained. It is more important to 
be able to understand the many ways the religion-like is 
invoked and imagined in action than to provide a new 
theory. Resource use decisions, like other lived religion-based 
approaches, helps us focus on the work of constructing and 
sustaining worlds where embattled relationships of human 
and other-than-human may continue. The worlds made 
as people take everyday religion up in their hands offer 
insights for life in the valleys, hillsides, passes and peaks, 
and along the busily trafficked and constantly remapped 
routes linking them. Endnotes
1. ‘Religion-like’ is a deliberately question-begging 
term Ann Taves (2012) uses to open a space for research 
into the distinctions people actually make in their lives, 
relationships and practices. ‘Religion-like’ doesn’t name 
a goal or ideal, but poses a question: to what extent do 
we find distinctions analogous to those in the theory of 
religion at work in various human cultures? If ‘religion’ 
is to have a future as a general term for analysis it will 
have to be because of its kinship to clusters of ‘religion-
like’ categories and distinctions in particular cases. I use 
‘religion’ and ‘religion-like’ interchangeably in this essay.
2. ‘Lived religion’ and ‘everyday religion’ are both terms 
used in these discussions, in by turns complementary and 
overlapping ways. I use ‘lived religion’ as a shorthand for 
the larger discourse emerging from attention to what 
historian Robert Orsi refers to as “religion as people 
actually do and imagine it in the circumstances of their 
everyday lives” (Orsi 2005: 158).
3.  In this discussion I’m focusing on English-language 
scholarship. David D. Hall traces the term ‘lived religion’ 
to the French religion vécue (1997: vii). In Germany the 
English term ‘lived religion’ is used for the study of gelebte 
as opposed to gelehrte Religion and bridges concerns of 
scholarship and religious pedagogy (Streib, Dinter and 
Söderblom 2008).
4.  ‘Bricolage’ is a term introduced to anthropology by 
Claude Lévi-Strauss (1966) which has had a significant 
career in religious studies, too. See, for instance, Stout 
(1990), LaFleur (1994), McGuire (2008).
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